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It has been more than a decade since Mu'ammar Qaddafi's Libya became synonymous 
with terrorism and was branded an inveterate enemy of the United States.1 The Lockerbie 
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988, the La Belle discotheque bombing in 
April 1986, the Gulf of Sirte clashes in 1981 as well as a number of other events helped 
lead to this situation.2 The United States imposed highly damaging economic sanctions 
on Libya's US-dependent economy in 1986,3 while the United Nations Security Council 
placed mandatory economic sanctions on Libya in 1992 and 1993.4  
In the succeeding years little more was heard from Qaddafi as these sanctions took their 
effect and helped cripple the Libyan economy and involvement in world affairs.5 Now, 
with the beginning of the new century and the suspension of the UN sanctions in April 
1999, the time has come for the United States to reconsider and possibly change its 
stance. There are a number of reasons for this assessment.  
In the first place the perspective of time enables one to consider Qaddafi more rationally 
and less emotionally. The United States after all had long been the main supporter of 
Israel, seen by most Arabs as a Western colonial usurper of Arab lands and rights.6 To 
confront the much more powerful American foe, some radical, but relatively weaker, 
Arab states - such as Qaddafi's Libya - turned to terrorism as their most effective 
weapon.7 In so doing, they argued that they had no other alternative and that the United 
States itself also used terrorist tactics when it suited it purposes.8 Viewed from this 
perspective, it is possible to regard what passed between Qaddafi and the United States as 
more of an undeclared low-level conflict than mere criminal terrorist behavior on 
Qaddafi's part.9 Indeed, over the years, the United States's evaluation of others it once 
called terrorists has already changed. Yasser Arafat, Nelson Mandela and Jerry Adams 
come readily to mind.  
When the United States aided the Contras against the Sandinista government of 
Nicaragua in the 1980s, it was for the supposed higher purpose of supporting "freedom 
fighters." The International Court of Justice (ICJ) thought otherwise, however, and 
declared that participation in a civil war by "organizing or encouraging the organization 
of irregular forces or armed bands . . . for incursion into the territory of another State" 
and by "participating in acts of civil strife . . . in another State" was not only an act of 
illegal intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign state, but also a violation of the 
principle of the prohibition of the use of force.10  
Arrogantly, the United States already had withdrawn from the merits phase of the 
Nicaragua Case after announcing that it "reserves its rights in respect of any decision by 
the Court regarding Nicaragua's claims."11 Citing Article 53 of its Statute, however, the 
ICJ declared in no uncertain terms: "The fact that a State purports to "reserve its rights" in 
respect of a future decision of the Court, after the Court has determined that it has 
jurisdiction, is clearly of no effect on the validity of that decision."12 The conclusion can 
only be that the United States too has used illegal force in its international relations just 
as Qaddafi's Libya did.  
In 1981, Libya challenged US naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean by unilaterally 
declaring the Gulf of Sirte an historic bay13 and thus Libyan territorial waters. If left 
unchallenged, this Libyan act would have closed a significant part of the high seas to 
potential US naval operations. To maintain its international rights, however, the United 
States did not have to goad Qaddafi into armed conflict by sending a naval force into the 
Gulf of Sirte. Given Qaddafi's unilateral attempt to alter the legal regime of the Gulf, a 
mere diplomatic protest - joined perhaps by other concerned maritime powers refusing to 
recognize this move - would have sufficed.14  
In its celebrated Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ rejected the British claim that they had the 
legal right to intervene in order to sweep mines away from Albanian territorial waters: 
"The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a 
policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as 
cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in 
international law."15 Even though the Gulf of Sirte incident and Corfu Channel Case are 
certainly not identical, the Court's import in the latter case was clear. Although it may be 
annoying for a stronger state not to be able to use force against a weaker state that has 
violated its legal rights, as UN Charter Article 2(4) declares, "all states have a legal 
obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force." In the 
Gulf of Sirte incident, therefore, one might argue that the United States illegally used the 
threat of force against Libya to assert its legal rights.  
Libya, however, was a much softer target than Iran and Soviet-backed Syria - two other 
states the United States branded as terrorist. Therefore, the United States felt free to dare 
Qaddafi to knock the chip off its shoulder,16 and the Libyan leader foolishly and 
unsuccessfully tried. As argued above, however, the United States could have maintained 
its rights in the Gulf of Sirte without resorting to such military pyrotechnics and indeed 
probably would have with a Syria or Iran. Indeed, just a year earlier Iran had committed a 
much more egregiously illegal act in holding hostage the US diplomatic staff in Tehran 
for more than a year before the United States even tried (unsuccessfully) to rescue them 
by using force on a much smaller scale than used against Libya in the Gulf of Sirte. Some 
time later, the hostages were freed through diplomacy and (it should be noted) the 
implied threat of what the new Reagan administration might do.  
In 1986, the United States accused Libya of bombing the La Belle discotheque in Berlin, 
an act that resulted in the deaths of two US servicemen and the wounding of 200 others, 
including 64 US citizens. Claiming self-defense under the provisions of UN Charter 
Article 51,17 the United States retaliated by bombing several Libyan targets. These US 
attacks killed some 37 Libyan civilians, including Qaddafi's adopted infant daughter 
Hana'a, and were probably illegal under international law.  
Although there can be no doubt that Libya had sponsored numerous terrorist outrages, the 
legal question was whether, from the point of view of international law, such acts 
constituted an "armed attack" by Libya, thereby legitimizing "self-defense" by the United 
States. Legally, the American case was less than certain. Moreover, the tangible evidence 
that supposedly linked Libya to the La Belle discotheque bombing was never made 
public, supposedly for reasons of national security. Given the Reagan administration's 
earlier willingness to employ a disinformation campaign against Qaddafi involving 
reputed Libyan assassins sent to the United States to assassinate President Ronald 
Reagan,18 one might reasonably query the validity of the evidence claimed at the time of 
the 1986 air raid. Although this earlier deception involving reputed Libyan assassins did 
not necessarily mean that the evidence for the discotheque bombing was tainted, it did 
serve at the time to question the credibility of the United States. While it now appears 
that Libya was indeed responsible for the discotheque bombing,19 the question remains 
whether this bombing constituted an "armed attack" against the United States. Ironically, 
one might better argue that it was the United States itself that had carried out the "armed 
attack" when it attacked Libya.  
Was the US attack on Libya then a legal exercise of "self-defense" as the term is used in 
UN Charter Article 51? International law prescribes that two basic requirements be met 
before "self-defense" can justify the usage of military force: first, actual necessity, and 
second, proportionality. The first provision means, as US Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster so eloquently put in 1841, that "it will be for that government to show a 
necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation."20 Judged by this criterion, the US attack against Libya cannot 
be justified as "self-defense." 
As for the principle of proportionality, international law requires - as stated in the famous 
Naulilaa Incident Arbitration dating from World War I - that "one should certainly 
consider as excessive, and thus illegal, reprisals out of all proportion with the act which 
motivated them."21 Even if all the alleged Libyan terrorist acts had actually been 
perpetrated, it is difficult to argue that the US air raid, which wounded and killed 
innocent civilians, was a proportionate response. Thus, the US air raid against Libya in 
April 1986 demonstrated the willingness of the United States to deal with Qaddafi 
outside the strict bounds of international law. 
The specific terrorist act that led to the UN Security Council economic sanctions against 
Libya in 1992 was the notorious bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland on 21 December 1988 that killed 270. At first, however, suspicion for this 
outrage had fallen on Ahmed Jibril's Syrian-based Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). With Syrian collusion, Jibril's radical PFLP-
GC had supposedly accepted a "contract" from Iran to avenge the accidental US 
destruction of a civilian Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf in July 1988.22 As recently 
as June 2000, Ahmed Seyyid Behbahani, a former Iranian intelligence officer and now a 
defector, reiterated a version of this scenario that also included Libyan operatives to do 
the job.23  
Eventually, however, Libya alone was implicated,24 and a US grand jury finally indicted 
two Libyan nationals - Lamin Khalifa Fhimah, the former manager of the Libyan Arab 
Airlines office in Malta, and Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, a high-level intelligence 
official - for the deed. A British court also indicted the two Libyans. Although continuing 
to maintain his innocence, Qaddafi eventually offered to pay compensation to the victim's 
families and in April 1999, finally handed over the two suspects for trial under Scottish 
law in a Dutch court. The UN Security Council then reciprocated by suspending its 
sanctions against Libya. One month earlier a French court had convicted in abstentia six 
Libyans, including Qaddafi's brother-in-law Muhammad Sanusi as the mastermind, in the 
bombing of the French UTA 772 plane over Niger in 1989 that had cost 171 lives. In this 
second case, Libya had agreed to pay $40 million in compensation.  
Although al-Megrahi was recently found guilty in the Pan Am 103 bombing, the point is 
that these terrorist acts occurred more than a decade ago during a period of low-level 
conflict between Libya and the West. Moreover, the United States itself - in addition to 
such arguably illegal military acts as bombing Libya almost three years before the 
Lockerbie bombing - also apparently sponsored what some might call its own acts of 
state terrorism. During the 1984 presidential elections, for example, a US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) handbook detailing the act of political assassinations in 
Nicaragua actually became a source of embarrassment for the United States.25 In March 
1985, the CIA apparently used local agents in an unsuccessful attempt to kill the radical 
Islamic leader Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in Lebanon. The car bomb these 
CIA proxies planted, however, instead killed scores of innocent bystanders.26  
Moreover, during the 1960s, again acting under ultimate orders of the US president 
himself, the CIA had attempted to assassinate such prominent national leaders as Fidel 
Castro of Cuba, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican 
Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam and Abdul Karim Kassem of Iraq, among 
others. As revealed by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Church) 
Committee, the specifics of these earlier acts of US-sponsored state terrorism were 
implemented in such ways as to give the US government plausible deniability for its 
actions.27  
More recently, in 1998, the United States bombed a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, 
claiming that it had some kind of a connection with materials used by Osama bin Laden 
to bomb the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Further evidence, however, indicates 
that this US action was probably based on faulty intelligence interpretation.28 The point to 
be made again is that, without giving legitimacy to his acts, Qaddafi has not been the only 
perpetrator of actions that might be called terrorist. As the more powerful antagonist, 
however, the United States had been able to paint its acts as legitimate reprisals (bombing 
Libya in 1986) or honest mistakes (bombing Sudan in 1998). Weak Libya, however, has 
successfully (and not without some merit it should be granted) been branded as a terrorist 
state.  
Even at his worst, however, Qaddafi never started a war against the United States or 
committed genocide (against the Kurds) as did Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The US State 
Department itself grants that Qaddafi has not committed any major act of terrorism in 
over a decade.29 At a meeting of Arab leaders in the Libyan city of Sirte in June 1999, 
Qaddafi advised his colleagues to avoid confrontation with the West because it would not 
pay for smaller states to be the West's target. He also declared that it had been "stupid" on 
the part of Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic to provoke NATO into bombing his 
country,30 and later offered strong support to the new government of Vojislav Kostunica. 
Shortly after Kostunica assumed power in October 2000, for example, Qaddafi sent a 
special envoy to Belgrade to congratulate the new Yugoslav president and present him 
with a check for 1.7 million Swiss francs for humanitarian purposes.31  
In recent years, one might even argue that Libya has been implicitly furthering the US 
goal of regional stability in Africa by being the only African state to give foreign aid to 
other African states. Qaddafi has also personally sought to mediate several on-going 
African conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Congo-Uganda and Sierra Leone.32 In 1999, 
Libya expelled the extremist Abu Nidal organization from its territory, distanced itself 
from other Palestinian rejectionists and implicitly supported the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process by agreeing to back any deal Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority finally makes 
with Israel.  
Finally, in an act of personal courage that arguably demonstrates his sincere hatred of 
imperialism and romantic commitment to what he perceives as justice, Qaddafi is the 
only Arab leader who has consistently spoken out on behalf of Kurdish rights. When 
Turkey finally captured the Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan in February 
1999, for example, Qaddafi released a lengthy statement comparing Ocalan's capture to 
earlier failed Ottoman attempts to stamp out Arab revolutionaries. The Libyan leader then 
declared: "To my Kurdish brothers . . .. Do not weaken or be sad for the more your 
enemy spills your blood the more he adds fuel to the fire of the Kurdish revolution . . . . 
Denying the right of nations to independence constitutes an act of ignorance and shows 
superficiality, selfishness and ignorance of history."33 Yet most commentators simply cite 
Qaddafi's longtime support for the Kurds as just another example of his impulsive 
eccentricity.34
Even before UN Security Council sanctions were suspended, Nelson Mandela - now a 
paragon of legitimacy and statesmanship according to the United States - signaled his 
acceptance of Qaddafi by visiting him in Libya in October 1997. Britain reestablished its 
long-broken diplomatic relations with Tripoli in July 1999, after Libya paid 
compensation to the family of Yvonne Fletcher, the British police officer killed by 
gunfire from the Libyan embassy in London during a demonstration in 1984.35 Egypt's 
president Hosni Mubarak, another close friend of the United States, has lent new 
legitimacy to Qaddafi by meeting with him in Egypt in October 2000. The European 
Union is now trading with Libya. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder met briefly with 
Qaddafi at a conference in May 2000, becoming the second EU leader after Italian Prime 
Minister Massimo D'Alema to do since the UN sanctions were suspended.  
Although recognizing improvement in its behavior and despite all these developments, 
the United States continues to argue that Libya still has not complied with the remaining 
UN Security Council requirements concerning the bombing of Pan Am 103: "payment of 
appropriate compensation; acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its officials; 
renunciation of, and an end to, support for terrorism; and cooperation with the 
prosecution and trial . . . . It remained unclear whether his [Qaddafi's] claims of 
distancing Libya from its terrorist past signified a true change in policy."36 If the United 
States does not change its dated policy soon, however, it might find itself needlessly shut 
out of the emerging new relationship.  
Ending sanctions would not be giving in to terrorism. Qaddafi has been made to pay the 
price for his past mistakes. In addition, as pointed out above, the United States itself does 
not have entirely clean hands either. Normalizing relations with Libya will be a win/win 
situation for both sides. If this reevaluation proves incorrect, there is nothing to prevent 
the United States from reimposing sanctions. The bet here, however, is that Qaddafi will 
become a positive factor from the over-all view of the United States without sacrificing 
his independence or dignity to the United States. In the long run, both the United States 
and Libya will benefit from this new situation. 
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